

The Making of Modern Muslim Selves through Architecture

Edited by
Farhan S. Karim
Patricia Blessing

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Introduction

Confining Contingency

Farhan S. Karim

Until recently, our understanding of the modern self and its boundaries was conditioned by Max Horkheimer's and Theodore Adorno's idea of 'non-identity' as the marker of modern selfhood. More precisely, in the *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, the two philosophers defined this 'modern' selfhood as a western self.[1] According to their analysis, identity exists as a fixation and calcification of the self that manifests in the repetition of the familiar and in the persistence of psychological desolation or neurosis. They explain how a tedious commitment to standardization – and a resulting anxiety towards the invasion of newness – characterizes modern identity. The enduring struggle of the modern self, according to Adorno, is the effort to return to a sense of sameness, or to create a recognizable pattern and landscape of familiarity through which to shape a coherent identity. The neurotic self, as he characterized this voracious desire for familiarity, is measured against a sharp distinction between the subject and object. The distinct subject, or the singular self, thus emerged as a form of cohesion between a presumed static interiority and a dynamic exteriority.[2] Modern identity, within this framework, can be appraised in reference to a *self* as the centre and in tension with a constant peripheral presence of the *other*. If we want to challenge this system of reference, or a modernity that is comprised of a single centre and a shibboleth of *others,* we need to introduce mechanisms for decentring, the possibility of movement, and the unseating of a nodal centre. Frederick Jameson explains how the recurrence of 'the same' symptomizes western modernists' inner drive to instantiate the power of standardization of the world by imposing a monolithic economic system within the functionalist logic of science.[3] While the premise of western modernity has been criticized for being neurotically static, postcolonial, feminist, and poststructuralist interventions suggest instead that the problem of the modern self is neither that its existence is created through a system of endless binary differences drawn between self and others nor that it mirrors a self-referential identity. Rather, the modern self exists in flux, to borrow Deleuze and Guattari's term.[4] The changing contour of the self is thus an assemblage of unrepetitive flows of non-identical relations and of perpetual changes. As a result, it is impossible for us to separate or disintegrate subject and object, interior and exterior, context and pretext. The self does not allow for a system in which subject and object exist by endorsing each other's authenticity and autonomy, but rather by destabilizing each other.

On a broader scale, this changing understanding of self and of boundary also shapes the way we understand the relationship between national and communal identity, and the role of the self within each. While nation and nation-state are often associated with the outer domain of political life, *the community* is considered to be related to one's inner self. John Armstrong, in

his classic study of the relationship between nationalism and communal identity, introduces the idea of *border-guards*, comprised of racial, cultural, and linguistic differences.[5] The border-guards situate *us* against *them* and thus strive to create a coherent ethnic identity and define intra-ethnic differences. In general, these distinctions allow a society to categorize and label different communities and the boundaries between them. However, recent scholarship has challenged the idea of fixed boundaries.[6] No single boundary can define and explain a community and its identity altogether; rather, at different times and for different reasons, a relevant boundary becomes visible and logical to position *us* against *them*.[7] In a sense, there is no single definition of inward-looking, fixed, and static identity.[8] However, the conception of the fluidity of identity and self, as advanced by a generation of poststructuralist theorists, has been further scrutinized by empirical study, which shows that instead of an absolute fluidity, the *self* displays a pattern of multiple identities and creates a hierarchical order of multiple *selves* in response to the political and emotional interest of a specific situation.[9] In other words, the construction of self and boundary is dictated by many axes of differentiation and, thus, exhibits a meaningful overriding of self-identification. Self is conceptualized within the confines of space – an identifiable cultural marker or symbolic border-guard – that creates boundaries around a community.[10] This boundary is created in reference to subject positionality, and, as Frederick Barth and Abner Cohen observe, a bounded community is predominantly a political space that facilitates social interaction and social organization.[11] In other words, individuals can choose to be identified differently in response to context and audience, creating a complex emotional ordering of belonging.[12]

This new sense of 'boundary' emerged from the post-nineteenth-century dissolution of large, heterogeneous empires into a mosaic of nation states. Since then, nation-building efforts in the Muslim world have gone through several phases of creativity and disillusionment. The plausible image of an ideal Islamic society vis-à-vis the nation-state has shifted along with major geopolitical transformations, and the incongruity between ideals and realities has informed resulting spatial expressions. This new sense of 'boundary' has not only determined the ways in which we imagine and construct the idea of modern citizenship, but it has also redefined relationships among the nation, citizenship, cities, and architecture. Boundary emerged as the most important physical container of a nation and an ideological container of self and nationalism. In general, the vast scholarship on nationalism posits the nation-state as an essential and inescapable force of modernization. In architectural and urban history, the impact of nationalism and state-building projects has been studied at length. Nationalism is considered both as a force that shapes the spatial and aesthetic culture of a nation and as a geopolitical and temporal limit of historical subjects in which the nation appears as a discrete field of knowledge. Nationalism is often treated in architectural/urban history as an all-encompassing project with the assumption that there cannot be any selfhood 'outside' of the nation state.[13] While certainly many modern subjects are refugees, this situation, according to the school of thought that sees the nation as the primary site of modernity, is only an aberration – ephemeral and unwanted. However, post-nationalist theorists have begun

to question this thesis by highlighting the issue of migrant and diasporic communities, and exploring the multiple identities that shape cosmopolitan citizens and challenge the narrow definition of nationalism that centres on race, language, or religion.[14] Thus, there exists an 'outside' space that is not subsumed by forces of nationalism, but is rather directed by communal, ethnic, or moral obligations. Recent scholarship and activism on issues related to partition and fragmentation, forced relocation, and the persecution of minorities have posited the detachment of nationalism from statehood and the creation of sovereignty for diasporic minority races. In doing so, a new deterritorial way of political belonging and, above all, an ideological umbrella to define citizenship combine to challenge the modern idea of nation and nationalism as bounded forms.[15] In addition, recent scholarship on the 'world city' and the 'global city' points out the inadequacy of the nation-state as an analytical tool for studying the rapid emergence of globally interconnected regions and economies.[16] This scholarship indicates that new forms of inequalities have resulted from the free market, large multinational corporations, informal economies, and extensive peripheral settlements in which the nation-state does not provide a meaningful framework for analysis.

These collective inquiries prompt us to question: does boundary only separate space, identities, localities, culture, and populations? What does it mean to separate? Does separation create a bricolage of heterogonous entities, micro and macro, literal and abstract? Does separation bring validity, authenticity, and identity to *self*? Does boundary indicate an organized system that operates by creating 'differences' among discernible conceptual categories and political frameworks? Homi Bhabha claims that *border* in a cultural milieu offers infinite possibilities for creating hybrid cultural forms.[17] Physical and cultural borders intermingle in such a way that the making and unmaking of differences, as well as confederations, hostility and solidarity, and inclusion and exclusion, release unpredictable productive power in society.

Boundary and Flow

This volume explores alternative definitions of bounded identities, facilitating new approaches to spatial and architectural forms. Boundary can be 'hard', such as the geopolitical boundaries regulated by states. These boundaries often result in conflicts over the ownership of territory and geological resources or even over history, authenticity, and the nature of the past. Yet boundaries can also be 'soft', such as those demarcating religious, cultural, and linguistic differences among different Muslim factions, or associations of a Muslim population within a predominantly non-Muslim society or vice-versa. Through the transition from empires to nation-states, 'boundary' has acquired new ideological meanings in response to questions about Muslim selves and citizenship. Against the context of global flows, several phenomena prompt us to rethink the relationship between architecture, urban planning, and boundaries. For instance, the transnational flows of heterogeneous Islamic groups as radical as the Taliban and as moderate as Tablighi Jamaat problematize notions of national 'hard' boundaries. While

some contemporary media outlets present international networks of madrasas and mosques as nothing more than a breeding ground of Islamic radicalism, the other roles that these spaces play in serving as transnational nodes in an expanding spatial network remain largely unexplored. With an objective to problematize and expand our knowledge about these different forms of boundaries, the chapters of this edited collection seek to explore how architecture and urban discourses can shed light on these new forms of identity politics and resulting internal dissonances within Muslim and global communities. In the remainder of this section I will discuss how the articles of this volume address the above-mentioned intertwined concepts of boundary and flows from different perspectives.

According to Habermas, orthodox Marxism, following Hegelian teleology, conceives of the nation as a systematic collective action or aspiration generated by contested communities.[18] The realization of a nation, per orthodox Marxism, is a historical mission that results in, as Habermas explains, 'idealized superordinate subjects', a society of identical members and citizens.[19] Nader Sayadi's essay problematizes this linear concept of the nation-building process by arguing that the pre-modern notion of borders as permeable, thick, and ambiguous zones of exchange characterized the Mukri region in southern Azerbaijan and eastern Kurdistan in the late nineteenth century. Sayadi's chapter prompts us to consider to what extent national borders actually thin out historically ambiguous zones of partition. With a view to transforming an amorphous border zone into a fixed, geometric, and thus modern, border, the Savujbulagh (current-day Mahabad) garrison was established in the Mukri region to ease the process of delineating the Ottoman–Qajar frontier into bordered lands. Sayadi argues that the garrison embodied the Qajar state's quest for direct control over the Mukri frontier and manifested its policy of excluding its erstwhile allies, i.e., Mukri chieftains and dignitaries, from the state power structure. Noam Shoked's contribution to this volume further complicates the linear understanding of nation-building and its associated identity discourse by studying one of the earliest housing projects for a Bedouin settlement, commissioned by the Israeli government in 1960. In this unrealized plan, Shoked shows that the architects, instead of forcing the Bedouins to become 'idealized' citizens, aspired to create an operative scheme that would forge a hybrid identity for the inhabitants. The aesthetic and practical aspects of this hybrid, or hyphenated, identity were delicately balanced. Although the architects' imagination of a hybrid identity was exclusively state-centric, Shoked's study questions the conventional view of technocratic postcolonial states as monolithic entities.

From a different perspective, multiple definitions of boundary and flows problematized our understanding of dwelling and settlement and their relationship to citizenship and nationalism. Questions of nationhood and boundary-making define the modern era. However, while postcolonial states seek a national economy restricted and controlled by national boundaries and imagine idealized subjects to activate that economy, the following questions remain: To what extent do existing national boundaries erase the identities related to life-worlds? Can the power of state governance replace a life-world with that of an idealized collective definition of citizenship? Can these two co-exist even if in a conflictual way? Angela Andersen's chapter explores how a state-endorsed effort to assimilate the heterogeneous Alevi Muslim

community with the hegemonic Sunni group was devised to eliminate the productive dissonances of Islamic sects in the Turkish Republic. As the chapter describes, this effort manifested in the form of a mosque-*cemevi* complex that was intended to integrate Alevi spaces of worship with Sunni mosques. Although on the surface, the objective of this project was to promote a hybrid/hyphenated modern Muslim self, in reality, all stakeholders resisted what they perceived as a suppressive assimilation effort.

Heike Delitz's and Stefan Maneval's essay discusses how the aesthetic program and spatial organization of the 'Mleeta Toursit Landmark of the Resistance' in South Lebanon aimed at stabilizing and negotiating varied conceptualizations of identity, which oscillates among social, political, and religious institutions. Architecture, as the authors argue, serves to configure and affirm Hizbullah's authentic connection to the land, and therefore it creates a political narration of Hizbullah as natural protector of the land. In a similar vein, Anooradha Iyer Siddiqi's essay provides an account of the centrality of objects and architecture – including the museum and its displays – as a portal into experiences of empathy and into the narratives of nations. Siddiqi analyses the founding and design process of Bangladesh's first museum of the Liberation War in the context of the emerging international movement to memorialise the experience of genocide and mass killing. Siddiqi's study pivots around the design and construction process of the Liberation War Museum and demonstrates how its effort to situate the events of 1971 in an expansive historical time highlights the diverse, multifaceted human experiences of the war.

Elisabeth Becker's chapter argues that the Muslim diaspora in contemporary Europe creates its own language of communal identity, including not only identity-based narratives, but also dissonant narratives reached through fusions with the local environment. By studying the Şehitlik Mosque in Berlin and the East London Mosque, Becker demonstrates that mosques can provide an effective spatial armature to produce these dissonant narrations, which simultaneously dismantle and forge a connection with the mainstream society. Mosques for the diasporic community provide not only a space for spiritual introspection, but also a social structure to confront and conform to complex transnational flows of socio-cultural dynamics. The chapter by Eva-Maria Troelenberg and Theodore Van Loan extends the above thesis by analysing the aesthetic program of the Islamic Centre in Rome, designed by Paolo Portoghesi and Sami Mousawi. It contends that the mosque's amalgamation of visual elements, both functional and decorative, from different eras and geographic regions, entangles it in multiple temporalities and overlapping territories. Focusing also on mosque construction in Italy, Hanan Kataw examines unrealized projects for a large mosque in Florence, and analyses the political reasons for the project's failure. Its unusual synthesis of different styles and historical references gives us a unique scope to study the emerging approaches within the diaspora in Islamic art and architectural history. Mujde Dila Gümüş's essay discusses the work of former Ottoman architect Kemaleddin and Mehmet Nihat's (Nigisberk) work in mandatory Palestine and argues that in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire these two architects attempted to create a unified narration of Turkish architecture to negotiate the fluid and volatile boundaries among the newly constructed

nationalism, statehood, Ottoman tradition, and Muslim self. In their jointly written essay, Katharine Bartsch, Md. Mizanur Rashid, and Peter Scriver discuss the inherent contradiction of the Immigration Restriction Act, aka 'White Australia Policy', and inevitability of the non-European immigrants in building the economic core of the nascent federation. The essay specifically discusses the peripatetic South Asian cameleers a key logistical role in the exploration and initial development of Australia's arid interior and how their mosque, as the locus of their religious, linguistic and tribal identity, mediated the values of late colonial settlement, laying the foundation for the complex narration of Australian community.

Architectural historians have recently begun to study the production of architecture in reference to the structural conditions of the Cold War, Bretton Woods financial policy, and contested theories of modernization, Islamization, and postcoloniality. Within such a context, the global flows of ideas, money, and technical expertise took place through intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Muslim League, as well as funding agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Development Fund, and the United States Agency for International Development. These contested groups of international stakeholders aimed to train local technical experts and to cultivate architects as development agents. The constituent forces of boundaries and flows eventually materialized to disrupt these forces, amid a proliferation of architectural and urban projects, ranging from small-scale, low-cost housing and rural development programs to large-scale modernization efforts, such as the establishment of nuclear research centres. Against this context, architectural historians often understand the works of western architects in the Cold War-era Global South as 'situated modernism', 'critical regionalism', and other such models that configure western liberal modernism as the *original* site of modernity. Based on Dipesh Chakrabarty's thesis in *Provincializing Europe*,[20] we may contend that the foreign architects in the so-called developing Islamic world did not simply situate modernity in a regional context (critically or uncritically). Rather, they worked as agents of the postcolonial economic order and facilitated capitalist transitions in the developing world. These western architects not only imported foreign architectural language, but also translated existing postcolonial thought for local audiences. Huma Gupta's article studies an unfinished documentary film on an urban housing project. Designed by Greek architect, planner, and development consultant Constantinos A. Doxiadis the new housing project was to replace the informal *sarifa* settlements of rural migrants on the outskirts of Baghdad. The documentary film was a collaborative project between Doxiadis and director Demetrios Gaziades. The planned film was to create an abject spatial knowledge about the *others* (as represented by *sarifa*s) as a binary opposition of development and thus to exclude all but subjects of development from meeting the criteria of citizenship. This essay underscores that, in addition to importing development knowledge from a mythical west, foreign architects such as Doxiadis served as active and often-contested agents of a postcolonial capitalist order. Carola Hein and Elmira Jafari analyze the Tehran Master Plan, a project with contributions by Doxiadis, as well as Victor Gruen, Richard Llewelyn-Davies and Michel Ecochard in the 1960s, and suggestions for its transformation by Moira Moser-Khalili in the 1970s.

No-Place, No-Time: The Case of Muhammad Jinnah's house in Mumbai

Turning our attention to recent debates about whether to raze Muhammad Ali Jinnah's house in Mumbai, we can now extend our discussion of the relationship between boundary and self to both the macro scale – the boundary between countries – and micro scale – the boundary between private and public. Respectfully known as 'Quaid-e-Ajam' (the Great Leader), Jinnah helmed the All-India Muslim League, founded the state of Pakistan, and served as its first governor-general until his death in 1948. Since 1934, on his return to India from a brief self-exile in London, Jinnah planned to build a house in his beloved city of Bombay. Construction on the house began in 1936. The architect, Calude Bately (1879–1956),[21] a prominent Anglo-Indian architect, relentlessly worked throughout his career to cultivate a public taste for modern architecture in India [Figures I.1 and I.2]. The house's so-called Islamic elements were most likely included on the advice of the architect Yahya Merchant (1903–67), who later designed the Mausoleum of Quaid-e-Azam in Karachi at the behest of Fatima Jinnah, sister and personal adviser to Muhammad Ali Jinnah.[22] Located in the upscale neighbourhood of Malabar Hills, South Mumbai, the property



Figure I.1: Front (northwest) elevation of South Court, Mumbai, n.d. Source: Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai.



Figure I.2: Gandhi meets Jinnah for the discussion on the partition of India at Jinnah's other house at 10 Aurangzeb Road in New Delhi, 1940. Source: Matlubul Hassan Saiyid, *Muhammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study* (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1945), plate following page 807.

spans 2.5 acres and overlooks the Arabian Sea. At the time of construction (*c.*1936–40), it cost approximately 200,000 rupees. In September 1944, watershed talks on the partition of India were held at the house, which became known as South Court. After the partition, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru refrained from condemning the house as 'Enemy Property', as a fig leaf to Jinnah. In 1949, India declared the house evacuee property and leased it to the British High Commission until 1983. Since then, Pakistan has unsuccessfully sought to claim it and convert it into a Pakistani consulate. The house remained vacant until 2003, after which a part of it was leased to the Indian Council for Cultural Relations to be used for cultural activities. Today, the property is once again vacant and closed to the public.

In 2017, Mangal Prabhat Lodha, Vice President of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of Maharashtra state, representative of Malabar Hill (where Jinnah's house is) in the state legislature, and a prominent real estate developer who has partnered with Donald Trump's real

Figure I.3: South Court, Mumbai, n.d. The rows of pointed arches springing from a paired column at the lower level create an impression of heavy ground, while the upper-level veranda, without the arched openings, creates an airy feeling. The overall plain modern façade is punctuated by the protruding mashrabiya-like oriel windows. Source: Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai.

estate business in India, called for the house to be labelled 'Enemy Property', which would require its demolition.[23] Lodha's proposal sparked debate about which historical pasts India should seek to preserve and how to accomplish it [Figure I.3]. It also manifested what I call revisionist activism – a kind of weaponized historical revisionism that demands action and the materialization of a revised interpretation of reality.[24] The objective of such activism is not only to amend historical narrative but also to alter physical reality. It has both moral and pragmatic dimensions. By destroying the house, the argument goes, India will purge itself of one of the aberrant strains of its history, namely, the Islamic past, and thus restore the country's original Hindu mythos. Lodha's demand can be seen as derivative of increasingly radical Hindu-nationalist sentiments that identify India's Islamic monuments as symbols of Muslim invasion,

marking them as threats to the Hindu identity of the nation.[25] For obvious reasons, both in regards to the integrity of India's Muslim population and architectural heritage, such claims have troubling implications. Notably, British colonial monuments have been spared from the political wrath of Hindu nationalists. The destruction of Babri Masjid in 1992 by the Hindu Kar Sevaks (volunteers who work for a religious cause), with support from the BJP, marked a turning point in the politicization of Islamic monuments in India. According to the BJP, the mosque was built atop the birthplace (*janmasthana*) of Rama, the Hindu God, and over a destroyed Hindu temple. The logic behind the destruction and replacement of the mosque with a new temple was established through the instrumental use of revisionist activism.[26]

The pragmatic side to Lodha's demands emphasizes the economic benefits of demolishing the house and freeing up the land for development. Lodha proposed giving the property back to the city, without specifying what kind of development he would like to see in South Court's stead. His pragmatic demand for 'development' is underpinned by an intertwined public sentiment in which the erasure of an uncomfortable past is considered ethical because the annihilation of memory will free the Indian nation from the burden of its past error, i.e., the creation of Pakistan and partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The collective memory of Jinnah in the popular psyche of Indian society is that of the 'the perpetrator' of partition.[27] Dina Wadia, Jinnah's only daughter, incidentally strengthened the Indian public's association of the house with partition by contesting the Mumbai state government's legal claims to the house until her death in November 2017. The opposing view, as advanced by several civic societies, to that of Lodha and other Hindu nationalists is to conserve the building in its current state, or to turn it into a museum of partition. The campaign to conserve South Court was not initiated to preserve its architecture per se, but to maintain the essence of a site where several important meetings regarding partition took place [Figure I.4].[28]

The house shows typical characteristics of 1930s- and 1940s-Bombay Modern or Bombay-Deco, with a hint of Islamic architectural style through the use of pointed arch-shaped concrete portals, and *mashrabiya* ('screen') oriel windows. Although historians have studied the development of Bombay Modern at considerable length, the building is hardly discussed in the professional and academic community for its architectural merit. In a sense, the debate over Jinnah's Indian residence is less about 'architecture' and more about the symbolism it bears, which is global in scope. South Court calls for reassessing our relationship with national, communal, and personal identity through architecture.[29] We may also take Jinnah's house as an opportunity to rethink how the relationship between self and nation could have far-reaching implications in foreign policy (e.g., between India and Pakistan) and global and local businessmen (e.g., Donald Trump and Mangal Lodha).

After partition, Jinnah very reluctantly tried to sell his house at an exuberantly high price and on some occasions expressed that he wanted to retire in his home in Mumbai, despite that it now stood in a foreign land.[30] Jinnah pleaded to Sri Prakasa, India's first high commissioner to Pakistan:

> Sri Prakasa, don't break my heart. Tell Jawaharlal not to break my heart. I have built it brick by brick. Who can live in a house like that? What fine verandahs? It is a small house fit only



Figure I.4: The back (southeast) elevation of South Court, Mumbai, overlooks the Arabian Sea, n.d. Source: Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai.

> for a small European family or a refined Indian prince. You do not know how I love Bombay. I still look forward to going back there.[31]

In the end, Jinnah could neither sell the house, because he failed to find a buyer willing to pay his high asking price, nor retire there. None of the Indian government's efforts to lease the property to new owners, including the British High Commissioner, the Indian Council for Cultural Affairs, and the Ministry of States for External Affairs, and give it new life has succeeded: it currently sits unused.

The house simply cannot be turned into a petrified artefact, as there is no central and static historical *meaning* or a single *value* attached to it. Jinnah's, and contemporary India's stakeholders', ambivalence towards this home, due to its paradoxical situation in both a *foreign country* and in a new *homeland*, symptomizes the extensibility, malleability, and multiplicity of the collective Pakistani and Indian *self*. This ambivalence of *self* may be taken as a quintessential

case for millions of anonymous *others* who migrated to both sides of the Radcliffe line. The ambivalent home is primarily a problem of space: that one lost their home in a foreign land because of the making of a part-random, part-planned line of partition. By redefining a territory, the partition line transforms one's dwelling into an inaccessible space or converts inaccessible space into a dwelling. In both cases the transformations end up creating places where we cannot return. The problem, however, also concerns how we define the beginning of a new time after partition. In the attempt to define the new post-independence and postcolonial temporality, a core aspect of the old *house* is forever lost in the transition from colonialism to the nation state. De Certeau identified this situation as the non-place, a caesura, an invisible void, in-between the transition, from which all historiographic imagination begins.[32]

Thus, Jinnah's house stands in a non-place, but it also occupies a no-time [Figure I.5]. Based on Althusser's argument we can say that the no-time is the despotic time, a time that interrupts the inscription of modernity and 'time without duration'.[33] After partition, Jinnah migrated

Figure I.5: An elaborate circular verandah space at the front of South Court, n.d. Source: Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai.

to Pakistan and settled permanently there. Only a little over one year after the partition, he died at the age of 71 on September 11, 1948. Was his *settlement* not shaped by the constant pull of Malabar Hill, which made his journey to Pakistan not a linear movement in space but a continuous loop of imagined cyclical arrival and departure in time between Pakistan and India? His empty and abandoned home overlooking the distant shore of the Arabian Sea indicates diffusion of the established binaries between home and foreign, private and public, and between subjective subconscious and political collective [Figure I.6]. In this time and space, the invisible caesura of history emerged to claim its position in the discourse of modernity. One may wonder whether Jinnah's home, to borrow Bhabha's language, perhaps corresponds to how the 'the unhomely moment relates the traumatic ambivalences of a personal, psychic history to the wider disjunctions of political existence'.[34]

Kavita Daiya demonstrates a strong relationship between land ownership and the circumstance of postcolonial citizenship.[35] She argues that post-partition state policies such as the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1954 established an irreversible



Figure I.6: The main entry to South Court, n.d. The design of the gate and the use of pointed arch recall a mosque entry. In a sense, the portal is used to evoke the grandeur, power, and spirituality of the politics of the Muslim League as embodied by Jinnah. Source: Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai.

relationship between the right to private ownership of land in the new country and the right to citizenship, so much so that belonging was no longer exclusively connected to territorial dwelling. The ambiguous meaning of Jinnah's home was anchored in the newly formed idea that conflates home and nation-state in one grand concept of Pakistan, as envisioned by leading thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–98). During the anti-colonial struggle beginning in the late nineteenth century, Pakistan emerged as a discursive construction, a de-territorial territory that would end the colonial project of repression of Muslim subjectivities in the Indian subcontinent. Syed Ahmad Khan advocated the 'two nation theory' that argues that Indian Muslims and Hindus ought to belong to two different nation-states. Iqbal (or 'Allama Iqbal' as he is respectfully called in Pakistan), a poet-philosopher who is often considered the spiritual founder of Pakistan, gave Syed Ahmad's theory of two nations[36] a more concrete expression. He, for the first time, pitched the concrete concept of a separate Muslim country at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on December 29, 1930, almost a decade before the Lahore Resolution that the same organization adopted in 1940. However, Iqbal's vision of Pakistan was quite different from that of the western concept of nation-state based exclusively on nationalism. As Iqbal explained:

> I am opposed to Nationalism, as it is understood in Europe not because, if it is allowed to develop in India, it is likely to bring less material gain to Muslims. I am opposed to it because I see in it the germs of *aesthetic nationalism*, which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity.[37]

For Iqbal, Pakistan was more than a piece of land or a sense of ownership of territoriality. Iqbal's idea starkly contrasted with the contemporary anticolonial sentiment of fixed association between sovereign governmentality and definite territory. Iqbal conceived of Pakistan not primarily as a state machine, but as a spatio-temporal idea in which an individual person could exercise spiritual freedom and subjective liberty. However, although Iqbal's idea confronted the sole emphasis on territorial sovereignty, in reality, Jinnah eventually realigned Iqbal's idea according to the ideal of the modern nation-state.[38]

It is noteworthy here that Iqbal and his followers' call for a Muslim nationalism was not specific to a separate nation-state. Rather the idea was founded on a universal and transnational *ummah* ('Muslim community'). The ideological meta-structure of transnational *ummah* provided for the Indian anticolonial activists a scope to place the spiritual loss of the Muslim self vis-à-vis the capitalist and materialist aggression of western modernization in the form of colonization. The Khilafat movement in British India (1919–22) was the first to combine Indian nationalism with the concept of *ummah* into one blended ideological movement. The idea of a sovereign nation-state was reified in the late 1920s when Iqbal travelled extensively across India, presented at international conferences and meetings, and delivered six seminal speeches in Madras, Aligarh, and Hyderabad that were published in the book *The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam*. Iqbal understood well that his philosophical Pakistan and

its mystic incantation through his poetry might work to motivate the public, but probably would not be effective in *realpolitik*. Therefore, he insisted Jinnah return to India from his self-imposed exile in England to lead the Muslim League. Jinnah, too, wanted to proceed with Iqbal's ideal of Pakistan. As he remarked in his famous speech to the Pakistani constituent assembly: 'Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would be cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of every individual, but in the political sense as citizens of state.'[39]

Importantly, the top-down discursive formation of Pakistan by Iqbal and his colleagues created an enduring cultural space that provoked a generation to create form and image to fill that space. In a sense, South Court occupies the physical space in India and the ideological space in Pakistan. In reality, however, the state of Pakistan abandoned Iqbal's abstract idea of nationhood in favour of imposing a singular form of nationalism over its diverse population. Per the postcolonial state's interpretation, the nation could have only one axis of cultural, linguistic, and territorial reference. The adoption of Urdu as the official national language, even though only an elite minority spoke it, is one example of how the state strived to create an operative framework of monolithic nationalism that would assimilate, if not eliminate, all differences.[40] Assimilation and elimination of differences work by relating two elements of difference in a hierarchical way, in which one part is imagined as inferior to the other. Thus, the inferior ought to be either eliminated or assimilated with the superior. The hierarchical positioning of differences and the resulting logic of elimination and/or assimilation of the inferior element create a series of binary oppositions such as tribal and urban, citizens and pariahs, etc.

Conclusion

The contributions to *The Making of Modern Muslim Selves through Architecture* diagnose variant forms of disruptive flows and address the question of how architecture creates nuanced Muslim selves. The chapters address architecture not only as the by-product of socio-political forces, but also as an active agent of those forces. They introduce new questions regarding how architectural history may be used to explore how diverse forms of nationalism within Islamicate worlds interact with trans-local exchanges of ideas, ideologies, and human migration across geopolitical borders. Historically, how were the experiences of partition and efforts at nation-building informed by architectural developments and urban planning? Who are the agents in exchanges of architectural knowledge and expertise? How are international flows of ideas, money, and expertise defined in competition and collaboration between local and international professionals? In the global context, how do practising architects tackle the challenges of boundaries?

As a whole, this volume addresses how the construction of self is primarily a spatial event, occurring within the nexus of power-knowledge-space. The chapters show that the sites of production of specific definitions of self, that is, communities and nation-states, are themselves defined by the spatiality of the social relationship. Furthermore, the articles trace how

architectural discourses and expertise flow between institutions within and beyond Islamic countries. In doing so, they remind us of the importance of investigating how these flows condition the training of 'local' experts by international institutions and thus contribute to the discourse on modern Islamic architecture. This volume underscores the need to locate architecture at the junction of the experiences of war, genocide, migration, and partition, and to understand the usefulness of architecture as a tool for negotiating the cultural identities of immigrant populations. What might the architectural expression of a migrant Muslim community tell us about the politics of construction and destruction of the Muslim self? How could the architecture of borders and flows be used as a means to better understand Islamicate societies in the contemporary world? By arguing that architecture is socially constituted and constitutive of the social, we suggest that the production of architecture has an important bearing on the creation and sustenance of self.

Notes

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